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Abstract
With the growing politicisation of European Union (EU) integration, the European Commis-
sion is increasingly facing a tension between technocratic and responsive decision-making. 
How does this tension play out in the process of supranational implementation under comitol-
ogy rules? We argue that the tension between the Commission´s role as a technocrat and as a 
responsive bureaucrat takes place during the implementation process when the issue at stake 
becomes politicised. We test our argument through the analysis of the Glyphosate renewal pro-
cedure (2015-2017). We process-trace the case by means of semi-structured interviews, media 
and document analysis. We find that with the increase of issue visibility and subsequent politi-
cisation, the Commission progressively abandons a purely technocratic behaviour. First, it puts 
in place political strategies such as delays and blame-shifting to release itself from the burden 
of unpopular decisions. Secondly, it seeks to respond to concerns expressed by consumers by 
proposing compromise-based measures closer to public interest. Ultimately, we show how the 
outcome of the policy process is mediated by politicisation and characterised by a shift from 
technocratic to responsive decision making.
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Introduction
Among the plethora of existing ´non-majoritarian institutions´ (Majone, 1996; Thatcher & 
Sweet, 2002) engaging in policy-making and regulation world-wide (Gilardi, 2009; Majone, 
1994), the European Commission has received some of the greatest attention in scholarly liter-
ature. In fact, its evolving features and role within the European Union (EU) system of govern-
ance makes it a particularly interesting object of investigation for several branches of political 
studies, ranging from organisational approaches to public policy analysis. 
While the Commission was largely conceived as a technocratic, elite-driven institution in the 
early days of EU integration, operating outside the public’s eye, an increasing bulk of literature 
looks at this institution as a ´politicised bureaucracy´ (Christiansen, 1997a) facing contrasting 
demands from the priorities of EU member states on the one hand, and from European citizens 
on the other. In fact, the originally technocratic institutional design of the EU, functional to 
the achievement of credible commitments to effective policy outputs (Majone, 2001, 2005; 
Moravcsik, 1998), has been subjected to growing politicisation (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2009; 
De Wilde et. al 2016) that has fundamentally challenged insulated, technocratic, decision-
making. (Haverland et al, 2007, p. 891). This view is corroborated by recent empirical evidence 
showing that the Commission displays a propensity to be responsive towards public opinion 
during its policy-making activities (Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 2014; Haverland, de Ruiter, & Van 
de Walle, 2018; Rauh, 2016), by upholding diffuse public interests where the public notes the 
respective policy choices (Rauh, 2016) 
Whereas, under growing politicisation, the tension between technocratic and responsive de-
cision-making by the Commission has been mainly analysed from an agenda-setting stand-
point, it has proved harder to observe within the context of supranational implementation, 
as the latter functions in a highly secretive manner through a system known as “comitology”. 
Moreover, the system applies to very technical areas of policy-making that are expected to be 
dealt with in a very technocratic and consensual way (Joerges & Neyer, 1997). Against this 
background, throughout this article we argue that the tension between the Commission´s role 
as a technocrat and as a political actor also takes place during the process of supranational im-
plementation, when the issue at stake manages to overcome the protected walls of comitology 
and enter the public arena. In support of our theoretical arguments, we provide a thorough 
empirical analysis of the development of a recent case of supranational implementation under 
comitology rules, i.e. the license renewal of the pesticide Glyphosate between 2015 and 2017. 
With this study, we aim to contribute to several scholarly debates: first, we add significantly to 
the literature on EU public policy by offering original empirical evidence for the Commission´s 
responsiveness in the context of supranational implementation. Second, we contribute to the 
specific field of consumer protection by analysing a highly relevant case in this area. Finally, we 
enrich the wider discussion about normative and practical implications of non-majoritarian 
actors´ responsiveness in policy-making. 
The article is structured as follows: after an overview of the institutional landscape and pro-
cedures under which the Commission operates when implementing supranational legislation, 
we will present our theoretical arguments relating to the Commission´s decision-making. We 
will then present the research design and measurement before testing our framework through 
process tracing. 
In our case we find that with the increase of issue visibility and subsequent politicisation, the 
Commission progressively abandons purely technocratic behaviour. First, it puts in place po-
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litical strategies such as delays and blame shifting to release itself from the burden of unpopu-
lar decisions. Second, it seeks to respond to concerns expressed by consumers by proposing 
compromise-based measures closer to public interest. Ultimately, we show how the outcome of 
the policy process is mediated by politicisation and characterised by a shift from technocratic 
to responsive decision-making. 
Mapping the institutional landscape: The Commission’s 
decision-making under comitology 
The dynamics at play in the process of supranational (EU-level) implementation are naturally 
influenced by the formal procedures and actors involved. Hence, in this section we provide an 
overview of the system under analysis. 
The approval of implementing acts in several areas of EU law relies on ́ comitology´ procedures. 
They apply when the Commission has been granted implementing powers in the text of a law, 
in order to discuss the implementation of measures before they are adopted, so as to ensure 
that these measures are applicable to the situation in the member states (Groenleer, 2011). 
Comitology committees are listed among the ´least transparent policy-making processes in the 
democratic world’ (Shapiro, 1997), and are traditionally conceived as means of intergovern-
mental control of the functions of the Commission (Ballmann, et. al. 2002; Franchino, 2000; 
Pollack, 2003b; Steunenberg, Schmidtchen, & Koboldt, 1999). Yet, functionalist approaches 
have looked at them as channels of expertise, which are detached from political bargaining, and 
which serve the purpose of efficient problem-solving (Majone, 2005; Scharpf, 1988; Wessels, 
1998). On a different note, Dehousse (2003) has showed how comitology committees work 
as ´transnational bureaucratic networks´, upon which the Commission exerts considerable 
power.In a more recent study (2014), the same author claims that comitology decision-making 
can be politicised and actually appears to be much more conflictual than it seems (Dehousse, 
Pasarín, & Plaza, 2014). 
In sum, views on comitology differ and open multiple avenues of interpretation of what kind 
of power the Commission can exercise within them. Yet, besides the informal and often non-
observable dynamics that may take place, under a legal standpoint, the Commission may have 
more or less power to decide upon the implementation of laws, according to the rules apply-
ing to different comitology procedures. These, in turn, depend on the issue under discussion. 
In particular, the ´examination procedure´ is able to produce three different outcomes, two 
of which may leave the Commission with considerable room for maneuver. According to this 
procedure, the Commission proposes a draft measure to the committee. When dealing with 
particularly technical policy areas, it bases its assessment on the advice of EU decentralised 
agencies (see for instance Groenleer, 2009; Kelemen, 2005; Migliorati, 2019), that is, ‘EU-level 
public authorities with a legal personality and a certain degree of organisational and financial 
autonomy that are created by acts of secondary legislation in order to perform clearly specified 
tasks’ (Keleman, 2002). Once the draft proposal is ready, member states’ representatives in the 
committee can either adopt or reject it by qualified majority (55% of EU countries represent-
ing at least 65% of the total EU population). When they fail to reach the required threshold, 
however, they have the possibility to deliver a ‘no opinion’ vote and, if this happens, the same 
proposal is voted in an ‘appeal committee’, composed of government ministries. In this case, 
two alternative scenarios may unfold, as displayed in Figure 1. In the first one, the Commis-
sion approves the measure unilaterally. In the second, it seeks the approval of member states 
by either dropping the proposal, or by proposing modified measures until a qualified majority 
is reached. 
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Figure 1: Steps in the Examination Procedure 
Source: European Commission’s Website. Authors’ illustration 
Empirical evidence (Joerges & Neyer, 1997; Dehousse et. al 2014) shows that cases of ´no 
opinion´ happen especially in the field of product safety, because these areas are character-
ised by considerable tension between scientific opinions and policy preferences (Ansell, 2006; 
Weingart, 1999). The reasons underlying these voting outcomes derive from the uncertainty 
with regard to the potential adverse effects on public health and the environment of some of 
these substances, and the consequent resorting to the precautionary principle1 of some mem-
ber states (Tosun, Lelieveldt and Wing, 2019). 
Previous empirical work (see Klika et al., 2013) shows that, especially in the context of GMO 
regulation, states are unable to decide by qualified majority, because they are deeply divided 
on these matters. Moreover, committee members have rigid negotiating mandates from their 
government. As a consequence, the responsibility of making decisions often rests on the Com-
mission. 
Under the present comitology regime, the Commission has the chance to ´take into account 
the deeply divided preferences of Member States´ (Klika et al. 2013, p. 333). What factors, 
then, shape the Commission´s decision-making in these situations? In the next section, we 
present our theoretical arguments in this regard. 
When technocracy meets politics: The Commission’s logics of 
decision-making 
This section introduces the theoretical arguments in support of our expectations about the 
Commission’s decision-making logics in the process of supranational policy implementation 
under the above-described comitology rules. Mainly, we claim that, when facing increasingly 
1 — Art. 191 TFEU
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politicised situations, the Commission is torn between its role as a non-majoritarian actor on 
the one hand, and a responsive one on the other. With this argument, we align with a view of 
the Commission as a ‘politicised bureaucracy´ faced with a dilemma between its duty to de-
velop and apply common rules and continuous political pressure for deviation (Christiansen, 
1997, p. 77).
First, we posit that in standard policy implementation scenarios, the Commission has a priori 
no reason not to act according to a technocratic style. The Commission is a non-majoritarian, 
technocratic actor by definition, which is delegated tasks by member states (Moravcsik 1998; 
Pollack 2003a; Franchino 2000; Franchino 2007) in order to produce credible and efficient 
policies, according to evidence-based criteria and scientific knowledge. When the Commission 
receives tasks from the member states, it is expected to perform them with different degrees 
of discretion (Franchino 2007) within the boundaries dictated by primary and secondary law. 
Especially when it is delegated tasks in very complex areas, requiring expertise that its offi-
cials do not have, the Commission relies substantially on the advice of EU agencies (Migliorati, 
2019). Previous scholarly accounts have stressed how, for example, the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) has gained de facto decision-making powers over time, and in most instances 
the agency’s recommendation is simply adopted by the Commission as policy without any fur-
ther investigation (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). Moreover, although it is difficult to quantify the ex-
tent to which the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) opinions are systematically included 
by the Commission in the policies it adopts (Groenleer 2009), different scholars suggest that 
the EFSA actively makes policy instead of simply delivering expertise to the Commission (Boin 
and colleagues, 2014; Hartley, 2016). 
Against this backdrop, we argue that when the Commission has to implement legislation, it re-
lies upon the best expertise available to it, by following technical advice and pursuing evidence-
based measures (Schrefler, 2010). The standard decision-making style in the implementation 
of a supranational measure will be, in sum, based on evidence and largely technocratic. 
•	 H0: In standard policy implementation scenarios, the Commission enacts a techno-
cratic decision-making style, by following technical advice and evidence-based criteria.
Yet, the Commission may find itself in situations in which its reputation, intended as the ‘set 
of symbolic beliefs about the agency’s capacity, history, and mission´ (Carpenter, 2010:33), 
is at risk. According to van der Veer & Haverland (2018), a regulator’s reputation is a vital 
asset to the safeguard of its institutional position. In line with this claim, recent studies sug-
gest that the Commission not only derives its legitimation from the added value it produces 
for its stakeholders (Majone, 1996; Menon & Weatherill, 2002), but also responds to public 
preferences, particularly in the field of consumer policies (Rauh, 2019). The implementation 
of consumer-related policies is particularly pressing for the Commission, as the primary objec-
tive of the General Food Law (Regulation 178/2002) is consumer’s and public health protection. 
Given that the Commission is the most important actor taking risk-management decisions at 
the EU level, for example to renew a license or to withdraw a dangerous substance, it does bear 
high political costs for unpopular decisions. Hence, if the Commission is exposed to public 
scrutiny, it plays a role not only as a technocratic actor, but also as a political one. If an issue 
debated in comitology comes into the public domain, the Commission has reputational incen-
tives to protect its image by enacting political strategies such as delaying and blame-shifting 
on the one hand, and by seeking compromise-based solutions in response to concerns raised 
by consumers on the other. 
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We argue, in sum, that reputational concerns in supranational implementation become a real-
ity for the Commission when the issue at stake manages to travel outside the ´protected walls´ 
of comitology. When the issue becomes growingly politicised, namely visible, polarised and an 
object of public mobilisation (De Wilde 2011; Hutter et al. 2016), the Commission faces grow-
ing reputational concerns that, in turn, produce political behaviour and ultimately responsive 
decision-making. 
•	 H1: When the Commission has to face reputational concerns, it shifts from a techno-
cratic decision-making style to a responsive one.  
Table 1 summarises our main hypothesis and the mechanisms underlying it. In the next sec-
tion, we present our research design. 
Table 1: Hypothesised mechanism 
Hypothesis Mechanisms 
H1: When the Commission has to face repu-
tational concerns, it shifts from a technocrat-
ic decision-making style to a responsive one. 
During the process of supranational imple-
mentation, issue visibility triggers politicisa-
tion, which, in turn, exposes the Commission 
to reputational threats. Therefore, the Com-
mission shifts from a traditional technocratic 
decision-making style to a responsive one 




Drawing on Klijn and colleagues (2010), we seek to focus on the procedural mechanisms, i.e. 
the system of actions and interactions, in time and space, between the different actors along 
the decision-making process in relation to specific outcomes (Kaufmann & Majone, 1986; Ri-
ghettini & Bazzan, 2017: 312). According to Mayntz, mechanisms state how and by which in-
termediary steps a certain outcome follows from a set of initial conditions (2004: 241). Mecha-
nisms are widely recognised as factors that have specific consequences for specific actors in a 
decisional network (Barzelay 2007:533). We hence undertake a causal reconstruction of real-
world events pointing to the activation of the hypothesised mechanisms (Barzelay, 2007: 528) 
by means of  theory-testing process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 56-60). This is a deduc-
tive approach recognised as ideal to grasp the interlocking parts of a mechanism leading from 
X to Y. We are aware that this methodology maximises the internal validity of causal inferences, 
whereas it does not generate any external validity per se, and therefore makes generalisation 
Visibility Politicisation Reputational Concerns
Responsive Decision-making
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harder (Schimmelfennig, 2015:103). In spite of these limitations, we deem this methodology 
as the most suitable to detect the critical point at which a mechanism is ́ unlocked´- in this case, 
the mechanisms leading the Commission´s decision-making from technocratic to responsive. 
Data 
The selected case presents a great advantage in comparison to most comitology procedures, 
because the salience that the renewal of Glyphosate acquired over time put the decision-mak-
ing process under the spotlight. A considerable amount of data therefore exists. This includes 
extensive media coverage, European Parliament debates, publications, open letters and public 
statements. In order to increase the overall robustness of the study, we triangulated the avail-
able empirical information with semi-structured interviews, conducted with actors directly 
involved in the process. We opted to gather perspectives from several sides of the policy spec-
trum by including: one legal expert in EU politics and advocacy; one highly-ranked Commis-
sion representative; one attaché member of the Committee of Plants Animals, Food and Feed 
(PAFF); two civil society members directly involved in the case, and a Member of the European 
Parliament working in the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development. We were unable 
to talk with members of the European Food Safety Authority, as they refused to be interviewed 
to avoid further controversies due to the excessive politicisation of the matter2. We did not 
talk with farmers’ organisations and industry representatives, as their unified pro-Glyphosate 
position emerged clearly from public statements and documents. Table 2 displays a list of in-
terviewees (anonymous), roles, dates, places and durations of the interviews. 
Table 2- List of interviewees 
Interviewee id Role Place, Date Duration





Interviewee 2 European civil society 
member (10-year experience 










Interviewee 4 European Commission 




Interviewee 5 Member of the European 
Parliament, Committee on 





Interviewee 6 PAFF Committee Member 





2 — Email with EFSA Senior Legal Officer, date: 19 February 2018
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A final methodological remark relates to the impact of the case selection on the generalisability 
of our findings. Being particularly salient in comparison to most cases of comitology proce-
dures, the representativeness of the case may be reduced and, as a consequence, its generalisa-
bility as well. However, we maintain that if the theorised mechanisms find empirical corrobora-
tion in this specific case, the same mechanisms could occur during any examination procedure, 
if the latter is subjected to the same conditions of politicisation. In sum, the peculiarity of the 
case makes it possible to observe dynamics that may potentially occur, although they often do 
not. In addition, given the increasing politicisation of EU issues, we cannot exclude that this 
kind of case will take place more frequently in the future. 
Measurement
In applying process tracing to our single-n case, we detected a series of observable manifesta-
tions (i.e. indicators) of our main variables of interest. 
Our dependent variable, that is the Commission´s decision-making style, varies from techno-
cratic to responsive. If technocratic decision-making is in place, we expect to observe that the 
Commission proposes measures in line with agencies´ opinions and with limited engagement 
with the public (Schrefler, 2010; Groenleer 2009). In case of public engagement, we expect 
this to be only limited to evidence/science-based claims (Boswell, 2009). Conversely, if the 
Commission behaves as a ´responsive bureaucrat´ (Rauh, 2016), we expect to observe political 
behaviour including blame-avoidance strategies, where the Commission tries to avoid or to 
postpone position-taking (Hartlapp et. al, 2014) and direct public engagement through state-
ments and press releases (Muhlbock and Tosun, 2018). Finally, a policy outcome driven by 
responsive behaviour would be observable in case the Commission´s proposal reinforces the 
regulatory distribution of rights and risks among producers and consumers, in favour of con-
sumers (Rauh, 2016). 
Theoretically, we claim that issue politicisation plays a crucial role in triggering the 
Commission´s behaviour in supranational decision-making. According to previous research, 
the politicisation of EU integration in general is composed of three dimensions. The first one 
is salience, i.e. the degree to which European integration is visible and important to citizens. 
The second is polarisation, intended as the degree to which public opinion diverges. The third 
is mobilisation, meaning the extent to which the public engages with EU integration-related 
issues (De Wilde et al. 2016; Rauh 2016: Chapter 2). In the context of our empirical analysis, 
we look at politicisation along these three dimensions while focusing on one specific issue. 
Hence, we identify salience as the extent to which our object of investigation is visible in the 
media and debated in public. When an issue becomes salient, we expect to observe increased 
visibility through news, media and public debates on the subject at stake. Second, we iden-
tify polarisation in high disagreement about the topic under discussion, resulting in conflict 
among member states and politicians, manifestly diverging preferences, and no opinion votes 
in comitology. Third, we identify mobilisation in advocacy activities, public protests and the 
use of instruments of democratic participation such as the European Citizens´ Initiative. Table 
3 summarises the indicators mentioned above. 
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Table 3- Variables and indicators 
Scope conditions: Scientific uncertainty, issue complexity/technicality, examination 
procedure








very limited engagement with 
the public, reliance on available 
expertise, science-based claims 
Schrefler, 2010; Groenleer 
2009; Rimkutė & Haverland, 
2015; Joerges & Neyer 1997; 
Boswell, 2009
Politicisation Salience/Visibility: Media 
coverage (newspapers, tv, inter-
net); public debates (politicians, 
civil society, sector specific ac-
tors…)
Polarisation: generalised disa-
greement about the topic, inter-
state conflict, no consensus in 
comitology, contrasting public 
statements by politicians
Mobilisation: Protests, advo-





The Commission´s direct en-
gagement with the public 
through public statements and 
press releases, delay strategies 
(e.g. delaying a vote), blame 
avoidance through public state-
ments. The Commission’s pro-
posal reinforces the regulatory 
distribution of rights and risks 
among producers and consum-
ers, in favour of consumers 
Muhlbock and Tosun, 2018; 
Hartlapp et al., 2014; Rauh 
2016
In the next section, we proceed to the empirical reconstruction of the Glyphosate renewal pro-
cess, followed by an analysis in light of our theoretical expectations. 
The Glyphosate renewal process 
Product safety rules in the EU
The approval of active substances3 in the EU explicitly requires the concerted action of the 
European Commission and one EU agency in particular, the European Food Safety Authority 
3 — The active component against pest/plant diseases contained in pesticide products. Glyphosate, the object of our 
empirical analysis, belongs to this category.
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(EFSA), to implement supranational provisions applicable in the member states’ territories. 
The procedure starts with an application issued by the producer to a designated Rapporteur 
Member State (RMS), whose competent authority verifies if the application is admissible. 
Within 12 months from the notification of admissibility, the RMS prepares a draft assessment 
report (DAR), assessing whether the active substance can be expected to meet the approval 
criteria. The DAR is then submitted to the Commission and the EFSA. The EFSA then proceeds 
to peer review and has to adopt, within 120 days, a conclusion on whether the substance can 
be expected to meet the approval criteria. Within six months of receiving the conclusion, the 
Commission presents a review report and a draft regulation on approval or non-approval of the 
active substance. This is when the comitology procedure starts and member states’ representa-
tives are asked to either adopt or reject the Commission’s draft proposal by qualified majority, 
following the comitology rules mentioned previously. Figure 2 summarises the approval pro-
cedure.
Figure 2- Active Substances Approval Procedure
Source: the Authors
T1. A standard renewal procedure 
In 2012, the 15-year license of the active substance Glyphosate was about to expire and re-
quired re-approval through the above-described procedure. Hence, several companies, under 
the name of ‘Glyphosate Task Force’, notified the Commission about their wish to renew it4. 
The Glyphosate rapporteur’s competent authority, the German Bundesinstitut für Risikobew-
ertung (BfR), delivered its first draft report in December 20135. At the time, some civil society 
activists were already interested in Glyphosate because it is usually associated with intensive 
agriculture and Genetically Modified crops, but the issue was mostly ignored by media outlets 
and largely unknown to the wider citizenry. 
4 — The Glyphosate Task Force published also a position paper on May 2013 to stress its position in favour of the 
renewal of the substance: http://www.Glyphosate.eu/system/files/mc-files/position_paper_of_the_Glyphosate_task_
force.pdf (accessed: October 2019)
5 — https://www.bfr.bund.de/en/the_bfr_has_finalised_its_draft_report_for_the_re_evaluation_of_Glyphosate-
188632.html (accessed: October 2019)
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T2. EFSA vs IARC and issue visibility
While the EFSA was conducting its assessment, on 20 March 2015, the International Agency 
for Research on Cancer (IARC) published a report stating that Glyphosate was ‘probably car-
cinogenic to humans’ (IARC, 2015). The IARC’s report served as a catalyst of visibility. Given 
that Glyphosate, employed by the multinational Monsanto in the preparation of a pesticide 
known as Roundup®– is the most widely used herbicide across the EU territory, the effect of 
this assessment had high resonance on worldwide and EU media6. The chart in Figure 3 dis-
plays Google trends indicating how salience started increasing sensibly exactly from March 
2015 onward. This is also shown by news trends7, and confirmed by our interviewees (inter-
views with interviewees 2 and 3).
Figure 3– Google trends Glyphosate 2014-2017
Source: Google Trends
From then onward, the diatribe about the dangerousness of Glyphosate was inserted at the 
centre of a wider debate about the alleged flaws attributed by civil society to the system of 
pesticide approval in the EU (interviews with interviewees 2, 3 and 6). The IARC’s report there-
fore signified an ideal opportunity for civil society to make health safety issues connected to 
pesticide use more visible. 
6 — The search for news related to Glyphosate in the period 20 March 2015 – 30 April 2015 on Google news produced 
a record of over 70 pertinent items from all over the world
7 — The search for news related to Glyphosate in the period 2013-2014 (when the standard renewal process started) 
on the Euractiv portal produced a record of 1 item (https://www.euractiv.com/?s=Glyphosate&year=2013&monthnu
m=&post_type=&sections= accessed: October 2019).  
The same search in the period 2015-2017 (after IARC’s report publication) produced a record of 266 items (https://
www.euractiv.com/?s=Glyphosate&year=2015&monthnum=&post_type=&sections= accessed: October 2019)
79B a z z a n /  M i g l io ra t i  |  E x p e r t i s e ,  p ol i t i c s  a nd  p ubl i c  o p inion  a t  the  c ro s sro a d s . . . 
The Commission initially responded to this escalation in visibility in a largely technocratic way, 
without releasing public statements, and by simply giving to the EFSA, on 30 April 2015, a 
further mandate to consider the IARC’s publication in its final assessment8. For this reason, 
the EFSA’s deadline was extended9, and the agency delivered its risk assessment report on 12 
November 2015 arguing that ‘Glyphosate is unlikely to pose a carcinogenic hazard to humans’ 
(EFSA, 2015). This opinion, which went utterly against the IARC’s assessment, met on the one 
hand an outraged reaction from the scientific community, exemplified by an open letter sent 
by a scholar, Professor Christopher J. Portier, and co-signed by 95 scientists on November 27, 
201510. On the other, it was welcomed by farmers’ associations and Glyphosate producers11, for 
which the stakes of renewal were very high. 
T3. The long road to the first examination procedure
The license re-approval was pending, at this point, upon a vote in the committee on Plants, 
Animals, Food and Feed (PAFF). In March 2016, the Commission sought to reapprove the sub-
stance for the 15-year period in line with the EFSA´s assessment12, but Italy, France, Sweden 
and the Netherlands informally opposed a new 15-year license for Glyphosate. The Commis-
sion then postponed the meeting until further notice. Visibility grew stronger in April 2016, 
when the European Parliament voted, on the first reading, a motion for a non-binding resolu-
tion urging the Commission to renew the marketing approval of Glyphosate for just seven 
years, instead of 1513. The motion was adopted with 374 votes in favour, 225 against and 102 
abstentions14. On 19 May 2016, the vote on Glyphosate renewal was once again delayed by 
the Commission. Indeed, although most member states were in favour of a re-approval (EU 
Commission, 2016), they would not have obtained the required majority. This time Germany 
(whose vote is often crucial under QMV, being the largest EU country) announced its intention 
to abstain due to divisions within the government on the matter, and so did France (De Car-
bonnel, 2016)15. As the license was due to expire on 30 June 2016, Commissioner Andriukaitis 
gave a press release on 1st June, wishing a rapid agreement and claiming that the ´ball is now 
in the Member States’ court´16 as regards the re-approval. 
The first committee vote eventually took place in spite of the controversies (6 June 2016), on a 
Commission proposal of ten years instead of 15, in view of compromising with such concerns 
and securing a swift decision (interview with interviewee 6, Commission Press release 1 June 
2016)17. On that day, the committee delivered a ‘no opinion’ vote, with 20 members in favour, 
8 — https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.2903/j.efsa.2015.4302 
9 — Ref. Ares(2015)3342030 – 11/08/2015 Subject: EFSA peer review of the active substance Glyphosate – Your 
request for extension of the target date to consider the findings by IARC as regards the potential carcinogenicity
10 — http://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Prof_Portier_letter.pdf (accessed: October 2019)
EFSA replied to Professor Portier’s letter on 13 January 2016: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EFSA_
response_Prof_Portier.pdf (accessed: October 2019)
11 — http://monsantoblog.eu/the-european-food-safety-authority-Glyphosate-is-unlikely-to-pose-carcinogenic-
hazard-endefrnlesro/#.VkTOkVNVhBc (accessed: October 2019)
12 — The Guardian, 8 March 2016 (https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/08/eu-vote-on-contro-
versial-weedkiller-licence-postponed-Glyphosate accessed: October 2019)
13 — http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2016-0119_EN.html (accessed: October 2019)
14 — http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-8-2016-04-13-ITM-012-09_EN.html (accessed: October 
2019)
15 — https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-eu-glyphosate/eu-delays-vote-on-weed-killer-glyphosate-licence-
amid-cancer-row-idUSKCN0YA1M1 (accessed: October 2019)
16 — https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-2011_en.htm (accessed: November 2019)
17 — https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/commission-says-10-year-glyphosate-extension-is-a-
starting-point-for-debate (accessed: October 2019)
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one against (Malta) and seven abstentions (Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Austria, Portugal 
and Luxembourg)18. On 24 June 2016, the appeal committee failed to deliver an opinion once 
again. This time, France joined Malta in its opposition, while Bulgaria joined the abstention 
side19. 
T4: The temporary re-approval 
The Commission then had to decide by 30 June 2016 whether to keep Glyphosate on the EU 
list of approved active substances. Otherwise, after a six-month ‘grace period’, member states 
would have been obliged to remove Glyphosate from the market20. Eventually, it decided to 
extend Glyphosate’s license for an extra 18 months, pending a further assessment of the sub-
stance classification by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). On 15 June 2017, the ECHA’s 
Committee for Risk Assessment (RAC) submitted its scientific opinion to the European Com-
mission, concluding that the available scientific evidence did not meet the criteria to classify 
Glyphosate as a carcinogen (ECHA, 2017)21. 
T5: Mobilisation: the European Citizens’ Initiative and the EFSA under the spotlight 
In spite of the scientific evidence gathered by EU agencies against carcinogenicity, the debate 
over Glyphosate escalated, and a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI)22 was launched in January 
2017. The ECI asked to ban the herbicide from the internal market and had high resonance 
in several countries, eventually reaching over one million signatures in July23. Controversies 
reached their peak when, in September 2017, a number of European media outlets published 
articles questioning the integrity of the EFSA risk assessment of Glyphosate, as the EFSA had 
allegedly copied and pasted large portions of the dossier from the Monsanto application to BfR 
(The Guardian, 2017)24. The European Parliament’s Environment and Agriculture Committee 
held a public hearing on the ‘Monsanto Papers’ on 11 October 201725 and subsequently called 
on the Commission to ‘adopt necessary measures’ to phase out the use of Glyphosate ‘no later 
than 15 December 2022’ (European Parliament, 2017)26. The day after, the Commission de-
cided not to proceed on a formal committee vote on the ground that committee members were 
still deeply divided on the matter27, and proposed a new text asking for a seven- to five-year 
renewal (interview with interviewee four).
T6: The third comitology vote and a five-year renewal 
As the grace period was about to expire once again after the ECHA’s positive assessment, on 
9 November 2017 the third vote on Glyphosate renewal took place. Pressured from different 
18 — https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=search.dossierdetail&Dos_ID=12899&dos_
year=2016&dc_id= (accessed: October 2019) 
19 — https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=search.dossierdetail&Dos_ID=12970&dos_
year=2016&dc_id= (accessed: October 2019)starting-point-for-debate (accessed: October 2019)
20 — https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2012_en.htm (accessed: October 2019)
21 — https://echa.europa.eu/-/glyphosate-not-classified-as-a-carcinogen-by-echa (accessed: October 2019)
22 — The ECI is an instrument through which one million EU citizens who are nationals of at least one quarter of 
the member states can call directly on the European Commission to propose a legal act
23 — https://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/successful/details/2017/000002 (accessed: October 
2019)
24 — https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/pesticides_glyphosate_paff_meeting_sum_20171005.
pdf (accessed: October 2019)
25 — http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/agri/events-hearings.html?id=20171009CHE02661 (accessed: 
October 2019)
26 — http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0395_EN.pdf?redirect (accessed: October 2019)
27 — https://euobserver.com/health/139634 (accessed: October 2019)
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fronts, including the European Parliament and citizens, the Commission proposed a renewal 
of five years. The meeting resulted in a no-opinion outcome28, and this time the Commission 
had to face an even stronger opposition than in 2016: Belgium, Greece, France, Croatia, Italy, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria. While Romania, Poland, Germany, Portugal and Bulgaria 
abstained, and the remaining 14 member states backed the proposal (interview with inter-
viewee 2). 
Against all odds, given the impasse, the appeal committee that reconvened on 27 November 
2017 eventually approved the renewal of Glyphosate for five years29, thanks to Germany´s ag-
ricultural minister who, unexpectedly and in contrast with his own government’s directions, 
voted in favour of the renewal instead of abstaining30. 
On 12 December 2017, the Commission finally adopted the license renewal for five 
years, and published a response to the European Citizens’ Initiative31, concluding that 
‘the Commission has no basis to submit the co-legislators a proposal to ban Glypho-
sate’ (European Commission, 2017). It added that, in line with the European Parlia-
ment and citizens´ demands, the five-year renewal period was ‘significantly shorter than 
the maximum of 15 years foreseen in EU legislation’ (European Commission, 2017). 
Figure 4 summarises the case timeline. 
Figure 4- Timeline
Source : the Authors
Analysis and Discussion 
The case reconstruction depicts a standard comitology decision-making procedure that shifts 
28 — https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/sc_phyto_20171109_pppl_summary.pdf (accessed: 
October 2019)
29 — https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/sc_phyto_20171127_pppl_summary.pdf (accessed: 
October 2019)
30 — Since the beginning, Germany’s line had been to abstain given the divisions between the social democrats (anti-
Glyphosate) and CDU. When the government crisis started, after the September federal elections, the Agriculture 
minister Schmidt took the decision “on his own” in spite of Merkel’s directions and the veto of the Environment min-
ister Hendriks https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/streit-um-unkrautvernichter-minister-schmidt-hat-glyphosat-
alleingang-monatelang-geplant-1.3769947 (accessed: October 2019)
31 — https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/pesticides_glyphosate_eci_final.pdf (accessed: October 
2019)
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into an increasingly politicised one. The Commission initially pursued a technocratic decision-
making style, exemplified by its reliance on technical advice and evidence-based criteria. When 
the IARC published its report, the Commission´s first reaction was to assign the EFSA more 
time to carry out its assessment, and to avoid delivering public statements or press releases of 
any kind (T1). However, it progressively had to face multiple concerns, including the European 
Parliament’s call for a license reduction (and later on, license withdrawal), concerns of several 
member states about the IARC’s report, and public mobilisation culminating in the European 
Citizens’ Initiative. 
Facing such a thick wall of ‘dissensus’, the Commission progressively abandoned its techno-
cratic decision-making style in favour of political moves and, eventually, responsive behaviour. 
First, it put in place delaying and blame-shifting strategies. The reconstruction of the case 
shows how, after cancelling two votes because it knew that states would not reach the required 
majority, the Commission’s first official proposal was of ten years, and was anticipated by an 
official statement by the Commissioner in person, claiming that states had the ultimate re-
sponsibility on the matter (T3). In absence of a favourable vote in the committee in June 2016 
(T4), the Commission faced the first direct threat to its reputation, and the first high tension 
between the two decision-making logics. Formally, the Commission could have renewed the 
product’s licence at least for the proposed ten-year period. In fact, the EFSA had confirmed 
its previous assessment about non-carcinogenicity32, the examination procedure granted the 
Commission decision-making power over the matter, and the European Parliament was for-
mally unable to stop any decision in comitology. However, following the EFSA´s opinion tout-
court and reapproving the substance for the full period would have damaged the Commission´s 
reputation as a consumer protector by going against civil society and European Parliament 
demands. Further, to ban it would have meant applying the precautionary principle excessively 
strictly, by putting the IARC’s assessment before EU agencies’ and challenging the reputation 
of its own experts. Hence, between the choice of being entirely technocratic or entirely respon-
sive, the Commission opted to delay the decision until further notice. It renewed the license for 
just 18 months pending the ECHA´s assessment and, eventually, a re-approval in comitology33. 
Alongside this extension, it continued to shift the blame for the renewal upon states (inter-
view with interviewee 6). This emerges from our direct interviews, but also from Mr Juncker’s 
speech about the state of the Union in 2016, stating that ‘It is not right that when EU countries 
cannot decide among themselves whether or not to ban the use of Glyphosate in herbicides, 
the Commission is forced by Parliament and Council to take a decision. So, we will change those 
rules – because that is not democracy’ (Juncker, 2016, emphasis added)34.
The pressures posed by the numerous signatories of the ECI, accompanied by a very vocal Euro-
pean Parliament35 (T5), finally (T6) led the Commission to propose a renewal as short as possi-
ble (interviews with interviewees two and six), i.e., five years (given that the renewal procedure 
itself lasts between three and five years). Such a proposal was the result of behaviour that had 
ceased to follow a technocratic logic. The Commission based its decision neither on agencies’ 
assessment, nor on member states’ preferences. Not only, at that point, had multiple assess-
ments by the EFSA and the ECHA corroborated the non-carcinogenicity of the substance, but 
32 — https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4979 (accessed: October 2019)
33 — https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/commission-prolongs-glyphosate-licence-by-
18-months/ (accessed: October 2019)
https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/glyphosate/earlier-assessment_en (accessed: October 2019)
34 — https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm (accessed: October 2019)
35 —  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0395_EN.pdf?redirect (accessed: October 2019)
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several states were also not in favour of a slim five-year re-approval. All our direct sources con-
firm that Romania, Poland and Bulgaria did not back the five-year proposal because they did 
not see any valuable reason not to have a 15- or ten-year renewal, given the positive assess-
ments by the agencies (interviews with interviewees two, three, five, six). Belgium and Austria, 
on the other hand, had decided to oppose the proposal due to the strong resonance of the Euro-
pean Citizens’ Initiative in their countries (interview with interviewee five). Given that Roma-
nia, Bulgaria and Poland represent 13% of EU population, while Belgium and Austria about 3%, 
the Commission would have benefited more, if seeking a larger consensus, from sticking to a 
ten-year proposal instead of proposing five years. In sum, with the escalation of politicisation, 
the Commission progressively shifted from a technocratic style to a responsive one, in order to 
secure its reputation vis-à-vis European consumers, represented by civil society organisations 
and the European Parliament (interview with interviewees one, three and six). Commissioner 
Andriukaitis in particular, made clear, before the last vote, that the Commission had followed 
all legal rules, that it simply could not ban the substance even if it wanted to, and that it had no 
intention of taking any decision without support from the member states36.: 
I am legally obliged to finalise the situation about Glyphosate, obliged by the law 
adopted by this very house. We cannot phase out the substance because there is no 
legal ground to do that. Who will pay fines if I take such a measure? They will go to 
court, because I am the one legally responsible. What can we do here? For me, it is 
crystal clear, science-based arguments are on the ground. Some say I am avoiding 
the precautionary principle – NO! I asked ECHA to assess once again because of the 
precautionary principle, and now I have no grounds to use it! (Andriukaitis, 2017)37
At the end of the process, the Commission did not ban Glyphosate, because there was no le-
gal ground to do it, given agencies´ multiple assessments of non-carcinogenicity. Yet, it did 
propose a ten-year license reduction, which goes in the direction of reinforcing the regula-
tory distribution of rights and risks in favour of consumers. The Commission was thus able to 
secure its reputation regardless of the final outcome in the Committee vote: even in case of a 
unilateral approval, the Commission could have claimed to have done everything in its power 
to reduce the license to a minimum.
Conclusions 
The Glyphosate license renewal is an example of increasingly politicised disputes about public 
health and environmental protection on the one hand, and the economic interests of both 
pesticides’ producers and users on the other. During this conflict, an increasing level of public 
attention was paid to the issue, and a turbulent decision-making process followed. This case 
shows how such disputes can heavily affect the policy process by modifying not only the prefer-
ences of states, but also of non-majoritarian actors such as the Commission. 
Hutter and colleagues (2016) argue that if an issue is not debated in public and is not articu-
lated by political organisations, it can only be politicised to a limited extent. In the scenario we 
described, visibility generated a snowball effect producing politicisation and, eventually, cre-
ated tension between technocratic decision-making on the one hand and responsive decision-
making on the other. The process shows, ultimately, how the progressive escalation of an EU-
36 — https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20171113-1900-COMMITTEE-AGRI 
(accessed: October 2019)
37 — The legal ground mentioned by the Commissioner is true to a certain extent, namely, the Commission can take 
decisions which are different from what the agency recommends, but only if the Commission explains the reasons in 
detail.
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level issue from hardly visible to very visible, influenced the Commission in its decision to delay 
the process, to do everything possible not to take responsibility for a renewal, and to reduce 
the proposed amount of years of the herbicide’s license to the very minimum. The delays and 
blame-shifting game that the Commission and national governments played with each other, 
and the Commission’s ultimate unwillingness to take an autonomous decision, highlight how 
issue salience triggers politicisation, which makes the Commission face reputational threats 
and causes it to shift from technocratic to more responsive decision-making. 
Process tracing, therefore, corroborates our main hypothesis, H1: when an issue is severely po-
liticised, this can influence the decision-making style of a non-majoritarian actor, even in the 
rather obscure EU comitology system. In sum, when expertise, politics and public opinion in-
tertwine, purely ‘evidence-based’ policy-making is simply not attainable, even though it might 
be more efficient. Member states’ governments, but also the Commission, need to consider 
diffuse public concerns, carried out by actors (such as citizens and the European Parliament) 
that are normally overlooked in the process of supranational implementation. 
What are the lessons we can draw from this case? First, we may find it instructive from a 
normative perspective, as politicisation seems to be able to produce responsiveness from dif-
ferent sides of the policy-making spectrum. This, in our view, can enhance the quality of the 
regulatory outcomes under the principle of openness38, which imposes on the EU institutions 
‘a prescriptive, proactive duty to seek broader participation […] in order to attain broader dem-
ocratic objectives’ (Alemanno, 2014: 85). While democracy is based on legitimate consensus, 
free elections and participation, technocracy recognizes expertise as the sole basis of authority 
and power (Radaelli, 1999). Hence, being responsive may represent a way forward to uphold 
the legitimacy of non-elected bodies vis-à-vis the citizens. Yet, a shift towards higher respon-
siveness may produce sub-optimal policy outcomes by hindering bureaucrats´ ability to find 
cooperative policies (Rauh, 2016: Ch. 1).
Second, the ability of the public sphere to enter such a secretive procedure as comitology, 
thanks to visibility, makes us speculate about whether, under the growing politicisation of EU 
integration, this might happen again in the future. Third, we find the case highly informative, 
as it shows how the tension between efficiency and responsiveness plays out in the process of 
policy implementation. In line with previous findings, the European Commission embodies 
an actor who has to perform different functions at the same time, and its logics of behaviour 
are multiple and dictated by efficiency and scientific rigour, but also by reputational concerns. 
Finally, we ought not to overlook the implications for the specific policy field we are analysing. 
The area of consumer protection – specifically related to food and agriculture – constitutes a 
particularly important dimension of public policy, providing a lens into a set of contemporary 
questions (Ansell and Vogel, 2006: 5) related not only to European integration, but also to 
the politicisation of risk assessment and regulatory science, and to the phenomenon of agri-
cultural protectionism. Recently, scholarly literature has started investigating how conflicting 
actor rationalities and the overlap of several regulatory roles undermine the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the decision-making and implementation of food and agricultural policies (Tho-
mann, 2018). 
This article has sought to contribute to all the debates mentioned above, by analysing a very 
complex case of supranational implementation in the European Union. Future research might 
be able to enrich this study through new empirical and theoretical work focusing on bureau-
38 — Art. 15(1) TFEU: “In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible.”
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cratic responsiveness in and outside the EU, political mobilisation, politicisation, and how 
these issues relate to policy learning processes and policy change (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; 
Schmidt, 2008). 
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